

GLOBALIZATION, SPATIAL INTEGRATION, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN NORTHERN PAKISTAN

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ABSTRACT The internationalization of global issues has become quite familiar in the sphere of ecological problems with impact on the earth's conditions of survival. Development related aspects are now incorporated into a discussion of sustainability in which issues such as global governance, structural adjustment programs for aid-receiving economies, and control measures for migration play a prominent role. In a holistic approach towards sustainable development the interrelationship of environment and economy needs to be stressed and simultaneously the time scale of socio-political transformation needs to be considered. These developments affect high mountain areas of Third World countries in a similar manner to other peripheral regions. This paper focuses on four aspects connected with development issues in high mountain regions which are exemplified for Northern Pakistan: the function of international boundaries; the governance of conflicts on local administration; the impact of road access on regional development; and the effects of external interests such as tourism and conservation of nature on local socioeconomic conditions.

These aspects have been selected to show the complexity of international relations, the high degree of integration into the world market system experienced by marginal regions, and the minority position of mountain people in this network. Along these lines the hypothesis is substantiated that an analysis of interest conflicts, exchange patterns, and regional disparities is required in order to understand the present development processes in remote mountain regions of the Developing World.

RÉSUMÉ *Globalisation, intégration spatiale et développement soutenable dans le Pakistan septentrional.* L'internationalisation des questions globales est devenue pratiquement normale en ce qui concerne les problèmes écologiques ayant un impact sur les conditions de survie sur la terre. Les aspects liés au développement sont maintenant incorporés dans les discussions de soutenabilité dans lesquelles des questions telles que direction globale, programmes d'ajustement structurel pour les économies recevant de l'aide, et mesures de contrôle de la migration, jouent un rôle primordial. Dans le cadre d'une approche holistique visant à un développement soutenable, il est indispensable de mettre l'accent sur la relation entre l'environnement et l'économie, et simultanément de considérer l'échelle de temps de la transformation socio-politique. Ces développements affectent les régions de haute montagne des pays du Tiers Monde, d'une manière semblable à celle d'autres régions périphériques. Cet article se concentre sur quatre aspects du développement des régions de haute montagne, exemplifiés par le Pakistan septentrional: la fonction des frontières internationales, la résolution des conflits par l'administration locale; l'impact de l'accès routier sur le développement régional; et les effets des intérêts externes, tels que le tourisme et la préservation de la nature, sur les conditions socio-économiques locales.

Ces aspects ont été sélectionnés afin de montrer la complexité des relations internationales, le haut niveau d'intégration des régions marginales dans le marché mondial, et la position minoritaire des peuples montagnards dans ce réseau. Cette perspective soutient l'hypothèse qu'une analyse des conflits d'intérêts, des modes d'échange et des disparités régionales est nécessaire pour comprendre les processus actuels de développement dans les régions montagneuses isolées du monde en développement.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG *Globalisierung, räumlich-administrative Vernetzung und nachhaltige Entwicklung in Nordpakistan.* Eine globale Betrachtung von Umweltproblemen im Weltmaßstab hat sich in den letzten Jahren gerade unter dem Aspekt der ökologisch gesteuerten Überlebensbedingungen der Menschheit in ihrer Gesamtheit durchgesetzt. Entwicklungsrelevante Problemfelder werden in jüngster Zeit verstärkt in die Nachhaltigkeitsdebatte einbezogen, in der Stichworte wie Weltinnenpolitik, Strukturanpassungsprogramme für Bezieher von Entwicklungshilfe und Maßnahmen zur Kontrolle internationaler Migrationsströme eine herausragende Rolle einnehmen. Bezüglich eines ganzheitlichen Ansatzes zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung erscheint es unablässig, die Interdependenz von ökologischen und ökonomischen Faktoren angemessen zu berücksichtigen und gleichzeitig die historische Dimension sozio-politischer Transformationen in die Betrachtung einzubeziehen. Selbstverständlich beeinflussen diese Entwicklungen Hochgebirgsregionen in Ländern der Dritten Welt ebenso wie andere Peripherien. In diesem Aufsatz werden vier Aspekte, die für Entwicklungsprobleme in Hochgebirgen relevant erscheinen, an Fallbeispielen aus Nordpakistan exemplifiziert: die Funktion internationaler Grenzen, die Essenz von Konflikten für lokale Verwaltungsabläufe, die Bedeutung von Verkehrserschließung für Regionalentwicklung, die Auswirkungen außengesteuerter Interessen in Tourismusprojekten und Naturschutzvorhaben auf lokale sozio-ökonomische Verhältnisse.

Diese Beispiele ausgewählt, um die Komplexität internationaler Beziehungen aufzuzeigen, den auch für marginale Hochgebirgsregionen nicht zu vernachlässigenden Integrationsgrad in das Weltmarktsystem herauszustellen und die Minderheitenposition der Bergbevölkerung in diesem Beziehungsgeflecht zu verdeutlichen. Anhand dieses Rasters wird die Hypothese untermauert, daß die Analyse von Interessenkonflikten, Austauschbeziehungen und regionalen Disparitäten eine notwendige Voraussetzung für ein Verständnis der gegenwärtig ablaufenden Entwicklungsprozesse in Hochgebirgsregionen der Dritten Welt darstellt.

INTRODUCTION

The historic experience of external influences reaching remote regions and affecting local conditions has been rediscovered in the recent discussion of global issues. Global warming, the ozone hole, and climatic changes have been discussed from this holistic perspective. While the ecological debate has incorporated this approach, less systematic emphasis has been put on development-related issues. North–South relations played a minor role as long as the competition and confrontation of different political systems governed international relations and alliances. During the Cold War the world was subdivided into at least three clusters with different affiliations. Globalization (cf., Robertson, 1992) of development issues has become more pressing as the gap between rich and poor countries has continued to widen. Structural adjustment programs, considerations for global governance, and the world food and debt crises are ubiquitous phenomena of the world today, as well as supranational concerns about the adherence to human rights, the spreading of epidemic diseases, the conservation of nature, international migratory and refugee movements, to name but a few fields of activity. Growing regional disparities and social differences accentuate unequal developments on national levels.

This more or less arbitrary selection of issues highlights a relationship between global, regional, and local levels based on historical roots. For an evaluation of potential sustainable development in high mountain regions significant factors influencing and stimulating the system have to be accounted for. Sustainable development when perceived as “to meet the needs and aspirations of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) essentially implies the combination of environmental and economic interrelationships with the socio-political and historical framework.

Imperial affiliations and strategic coalitions have shown their impact on the political and economic world map. High mountain regions of the Developing World form parts of comparatively young countries/nation states and participate to a varying degree in their respective development models. Centralized institutions do decide about national development plans and budgets, implement infrastructural enterprises, levy taxes, and enact legislation. In this context mountain societies very often play the role of minorities living in marginal and remote regions. Lacking proper representation and power of adult franchise, the resulting conflicts are foregone conclusions. The articulation of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and/or spatial interests is often perceived as regionalism expressing a tension between core and periphery. In a global perspective all mountain dwellers are members of minority groups. In the context of the following statements minority relations are understood as a reflex of societal powerlessness sometimes only perceived in its articulation of regionalism, communalism, or in so-called sectarian clashes. Disputes about control of natural and societal resources, the distribution of public wealth, and participation in communal undertakings are fields of confrontation on local and regional levels which are often stimulated by extra-regional developments.

These relations in space and time structure development issues in mountain regions as in other remote areas and must be included in the discussion of sustainability in as much as growth-related factors such as population expansion, per-capita income, and resource potential. Some aspects of these relationships and their interdependence are emphasized by presenting exemplar developments from the mountain belt that separates South from Central Asia. The following statements should be regarded as a plea for increased efforts to analyze transformation processes and to include global issues in the study of sustainability for peripheral mountain regions.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS: ARTIFICIAL BORDERS AS COLONIAL HERITAGE

A few cases in point from the turn of the century may illustrate how mountain regions have been involved in the demarcation of spheres of influence. The contenders of the *Great Game* in High Asia agreed to lay down boundaries in the comparatively sparsely populated regions of the Hindukush and Pamir. Sometimes these borders were described as natural frontiers, or scientific boundaries. The Durand Line of 1893 separating Afghanistan from British India/Pakistan epitomizes such an effort and has continued to function as the symbol of colonial border delineation referred to as the dividing line (Felmy, 1993). In order to safeguard the physical separation of two imperial opponents, international borders were outlined and Afghanistan was created as a buffer state. Local and regional interests were neglected and reduced to the level of secondary importance. The Pashtun settlement region was divided into two parts and the traditional migratory

paths of nomads were severed. Numerous clashes between tribal groups and imperial troops in the borderlands characterized the political relations in the frontier which served as a buffer belt on the fringe of the empire (Fraser-Tytler, 1953). Now a special legal status has been assigned to these regions (Figure 1) as they are governed as Federally or Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (FATA or PATA). The movement of nomads (*powindah*) and their herds now depends on bilateral political relations; it has been restricted, but has not ceased.

The Wakhan Corridor of northeastern Afghanistan symbolizes colonial border delineation. The southern limit is formed by the Durand Line (south) while the northern part came into existence as a result of the Pamir Boundary Commission of 1895 in which Russian and British officers negotiated the demarcation. This narrow strip, 300 km long and only 15–75 km wide, separated




FIGURE 1. Disputed territories and constitutional peculiarities in Western High Asia.

Russian and British spheres of influences and functioned to deter military action between the two superpowers of that period and region. The price for this colonial endeavor was the spatial division of regional semi-autonomous principalities like Badakhshan, Wakhan, Shughnan, and Roshan. The imposition of these boundaries resulted in immediate refugee movements by ethnic minorities and continuing border disputes and conflicts such as the irredentist movement for "Pashtunistan." The missing link between both borders is the short Sino-Afghan boundary which in itself is part of a disputed frontier. According to Chinese opinion, their border with Afghanistan and Tajikistan extends further west while the actual contemporary boundary is accepted by China's neighbors.

All these borders formed an integral part of the major global divide after World War II. The front lines of the Cold War followed their historical predecessors. Western and Eastern alliances, as well as neutral states like Afghanistan (up to 1978) and the independent anti-Soviet path of Chinese communism (since 1958), met in the Pamirian Knot. Thus, a remote mountain region became a meeting-point of competing political systems.

The alleviation of this confrontation did not terminate military action in the region. The Pamir Boundary presently separates the newly independent state (since 1991) of Tajikistan from war-stricken Afghanistan. The former global confrontation has been replaced by regional conflicts. Along both sides of this border a number of refugee camps still host more than 60,000 people who have

been displaced during recent civil wars (UNHCR, 1993: App. 1.1). Nevertheless, these examples are not singular cases. Nearly all borders of the Hindukush-Himalayan arc are under dispute by one side or the other. The boundary politics and resulting disputes have been discussed by Lamb (1964); Woodman (1969); Razvi (1971); Prescott (1975, 1987); Embree (1979); Garver (1981); and Kreutzmann (1993a). The McMahon Line of 1914 delineating the eastern border between India and Tibet/China plays a similar role and has been a cause of military action in the 1962 Indo-China war and of continuing disputes be-

tween both countries. The origin and effects of demarcation of the Indo-China border between Bhutan in the west and Burma in the east have been described in great detail with historical references by Lamb (1964, 1966b); Woodman (1969); and Maxwell (1972).

Related to the process of subcontinental decolonization and the application of the *Two-Nation-Theory* (Hindu/Muslim) is the conflict over Kashmir (Table 1) where the frontier regions (*illaqa*) or traditional spheres of suzerainty have caused major territorial disputes and wars between the neighboring countries of India and Pakistan.

THE KASHMIR STALEMATE: GENESIS, ACTUAL IMPORTANCE, AND RELATED PROBLEMS

The continuing dispute between India, Pakistan, and the people of Kashmir about the constitutional and territorial status of what was formerly the largest princely state of the Indian Empire originates from two perspectives.

First, the implementation of the so-called "two-nation theory" has failed in Kashmir. The Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh who belonged to the Hindu Dogra dynasty, ruled over a population the majority of which followed the Muslim faith. Exceptions to this occurred in Buddhist-dominated Ladakh/Zaskar and Hindu-dominated Jammu. According to the last census before partition (1941) the population of Jammu and Kashmir was calculated at 4.02 million inhabitants (Wreford, 1943). The religious composition was given as 77.1% Muslim, 20.1% Hindu, 1.7% Sikh, 1.0% Buddhist, and 0.1% Christian. Playing for independence from India and Pakistan, Maharaja Hari Singh deliberately postponed any decision about accession to either side. The story of the 1947–48 Kashmir war, interference of troops from Pakistan and India, and a UN-negotiated peace treaty have repeatedly been discussed. Broad, and often biased, accounts of the Kashmir conflict have been given by Lamb, 1966a, 1967, 1991, 1994; Myrdal, 1968, I: 251-256; Kak, 1977; Tariq, 1991; Wakhlu and Wakhlu, 1992; and Valie, 1993. The first Kashmir war broke out shortly after independence in 1947 and the Indian army, as well as the Pakistan army, were commanded by British high-ranking officers, and this led to a paradoxical confrontation: in October 1947 Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck was the Commander-in-Chief of both the Indian and Pakistan Armies. Some authors suggest that this fact led to the early involvement of the United Nations in peace negotiations (Tariq Ali, 1983: 65; Lamb, 1994: 69). According to Lamb (1994: 71-72) "the opinion of most [contemporary] British observers... was that the best solution lay in a partition of the old state of Jammu and Kashmir, essentially with Ladakh and much of Jammu going to India and the rest to Pakistan." The concept of partition was reiterated by the British UN representative in 1950 but rejected by India and Pakistan in favor of a unitary plebiscite in all of Kashmir.

This confrontation resulted in a cease-fire line separating Indian and Pakistan spheres of influence. With minor deviations it survived the 1965 war which saw Kashmir as

the major military theater. The Tashkent agreement of January 1966, negotiated between Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and President Ayub Khan under mediation from the Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, confirmed the status quo and the retreat of troops behind the actual line of control. During the third Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, Kashmir experienced a secondary role and the 1972 Simla Conference extended the status quo again. Since then all demands for an impartial and internationally supervised referendum/plebiscite on the future status of Kashmir have been postponed, but continue to play a prominent role in the everyday propaganda of both countries. From the beginning, India has refused to permit a people's verdict on the future of Kashmir. In contrast, in the case of Junagadh—a former princely state with a Muslim ruler and a majority Hindu population in the Kathiawar Peninsula (Gujarat)—the Indian viewpoint was different. Although the ruler of Junagadh had formally acceded to Pakistan on Independence Day (1947) this was provisionally accepted by India conditional upon the results of a plebiscite. Emphasis was put on the fact that in regions where the rulers' religious affiliations differed from those of the people referenda should be held (Lamb, 1994: 68). This principle obviously counteracted India's strategic interests in Kashmir. While Junagadh has effectively been integrated into India—only the Atlas of Pakistan (Syed, 1985: 95) still identifies it as a Pakistani exclave—the Kashmir stalemate prevails.

Since the mid-1980s fighting between specially trained army units for the control of the Siachin glacier region has taken place every summer. The barren tracks of the uninhabited Siachin region form an ideal battle-ground, where both sides are fighting because of the shortcomings of land surveyors' and diplomats' ambiguity in a commercially unproductive territory. Unfortunately, servicemen from the mountain regions who are adapted to, and who are able to survive in, altitudes above 5,000 m become the victims of this senseless fight year after year. The Kashmir wars have bound huge amounts of armory in the Northern regions for a battle between two independent states where local residents are chess pieces in a competition no side might ever totally win.

A second point should be emphasized because of its importance in related disputes: the extent of the state

TABLE 1
Chronology of the Kashmir Conflict

Year	Event
1846	March 16: After the end of the Sikh interregnum (1819-1846) in the Vale of Kashmir the succeeding East India Company was reluctant to exert direct control in this northernmost outpost. In the Treaty of Amritsar Kashmir was sold to the Dogra ruler of Jammu, Ghulab Singh, who acquired the fertile valley for Rs 500,000. British military assistance safeguarded his foothold in a hostile environment where the majority of the local population offered strong resistance. Beginning of a century-long Dogra rule in Kashmir which enjoyed a substantial degree of legislative and jurisdictional independence within the British Indian Empire.
1895	Establishment of British residency in Srinagar. Completion of mule track between Srinagar and Gilgit. Reorganisation of administrative setup in the Gilgit Agency; resumption of transfer of subsidies to the hereditary rulers and appointed governors of the Gilgit Agency by the Kashmir Durbar and British India.
1935	Government of India Act laying the foundations for the British withdrawal and the integration of the Indian Princely States into a federated dominion by signing an "Instrument of Accession," thus preparing the transfer of powers to the respective dominion such as the representation in external and defence affairs as well as the control of communications. Maharaja Hari Singh managed to bring under control the territory of Poonch. Lease of Gilgit Wazarat from Maharaja of Kashmir by British India for a period of 60 years. Development of Kaghan route for supply of Gilgit Agency with British-Indian goods from Punjab.
1938	Sheikh Abdullah (Lion of Kashmir) founds the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference.
1946	Jammu and Kashmir National Conference demands independence from Dogra rule, resulting in the imprisonment of Sheikh Abdullah (released only in September 1947).
1947-49	The dispute about Kashmir leads in October 1947 to the first war between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of independence. The Dogra Maharaja delays his decision about accession to either side which causes confrontation between both countries. A forceful and immediate military reaction upon the decision to join India brings Pakistan army and Gilgit forces onto the scene. Indian army is airlifted into the valley of Kashmir and a full fledged war begins. Substantial territorial gains finally result in the demarcation of the cease fire-line between the two countries. India and Pakistan adopt the UN Resolution to withdraw the majority of their respective forces in order to hold a plebiscite in due course. In this referendum the Kashmiri people would be asked to decide by themselves about accession to India or Pakistan.
1950-59	Pakistan reiterates its demand for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir which is refused by India under different pretexts.
1965	Indo-Pakistan war with the Kashmir cease-fire line as a major area of armed confrontation.
1966	Tashkent Agreement restores the former cease-fire line between India and Pakistan but fails to accelerate the process of solving the Kashmir stalemate. The <i>status quo</i> situation is retained.
1971	Indo-Pakistan war: the separation of West and East Pakistan leads to the independence of Bangladesh, in addition fighting along the cease-fire line in Kashmir.
1972	Simla Conference: a new line of control separates the different spheres of influence in Pakistan-dominated Azad Kashmir and Indian-controlled Jammu and Kashmir; both countries agree upon a peaceful settlement of existing differences.
1985-1992	Annual high-altitude skirmishes and fighting between Indian and Pakistan troops in the Siachin glacier region where the ambiguity of the line of control is disputed.
since 1990	Internal turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir where Kashmiri nationalists demand more autonomy from Delhi. Heavy casualties and numerous arrests are results of this confrontation.
1992	Bilateral negotiations about an agreement to end the Siachin confrontation.
1993	October 15: Siege of Hazratbal Mosque: Kashmir militants occupy the holy shrine and use it as a fortress; it is besieged by Indian army troops; a negotiated settlement ends this confrontation.
1994	September: UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali offers his services for a negotiation between India and Pakistan to solve the Kashmir crisis. India rejects this offer and claims the dispute to be a bilateral issue only.

ruled by the former Maharaja of Kashmir and its status under international law is incongruous in the demands of all concerned parties. On Indian maps up to the present day, the whole of the Northern Areas—the former Gilgit Agency including the then principalities of Hunza, Nager, and the governorships of Puniyal, Yasin, Kuh, Ghizer and Ishkoman, the Chilas and Baltistan Districts—are marked as part of Indian Kashmir (Figure 1). According to that opinion, Kashmir has borders in the west with Chitral (North-West Frontier Province) and in the north with China. But India deprecates the present frontier line with China as well. This delineation originates from the 1963 Pak-Chinese Treaty which involved a settlement about 8,800 km² of disputed territory of which Pakistan has since controlled 40 percent; for discussion of this agreement see Woodman (1969, with maps on pp. 198, 308) and Razvi (1971: 176–182); the full text of the treaty has been published in Prescott (1975: 234–237). In addition, the Chinese claims for Aksai Chin which followed the construction of the Xinjiang–Tibet road through this uninhabited territory in 1956 are unacceptable for India (Fisher *et al.*, 1963: 145–146; Lamb, 1964: 75–87; Woodman, 1969; Maxwell, 1972: 80–84). Consequently Indian maps indicate that Aksai Chin is within its own national boundaries.


Pakistan's views have changed over time. In the aftermath of the local uprising causing the abolition of Dogra rule in Gilgit and Baltistan, a short-lived "Independent Republic of Gilgit" was established on 1 November 1947 preparing the way for a unanimously accepted accession to Pakistan. A protagonist's account of these events has been given by Shah Khan (1950); for further historical discussions and contrasting viewpoints see *The Times*, 2 January 1948; Kak, 1977; Dani, 1989: 326–407; Lamb, 1991: 53–100). Consequently, the official document of the Pakistan Government distinguishes between Kashmir on the one hand and the Gilgit Agency on the other. This viewpoint is supported by a lengthy historical investigation and legal interpretation within colonial files regarding the status of certain territories in the Gilgit Agency. In 1941 an internal decision binding for administrative purposes summarized the results of a previous discussion for two exemplar principalities in question: "Hunza and Nagir:—Though these are under the suzerainty of the Kashmir State, they are not part of Kashmir but separate states." (Quotation from the Crown Representative's Records—Indian States Residencies—Gilgit, Chilas, Hunza and Nagir Files (Confidential): Serial No. IOR/2/1086/303—Number of Proceedings 17-C/41: Status of Hunza, Nagir...vis-a-vis the Kashmir State: decision that these territories are not part of the Kashmir State [India Office Library and Records, London]. This discussion is continued under the same heading in IOR/2/1086/304).

This deliberate uncertainty in the formulation of the legal status is one of the obstacles for a negotiated solution. The Government of Pakistan has treated the Northern Areas and Kashmir as separate entities, which is reflected in different constitutional configurations (Figure 2). Azad Kashmir is governed by its own President elected from an assembly composed of the AK Parliament and the

AK Council. In contrast, the Northern Areas are granted neither provincial status within Pakistan nor a similar semi-autonomous parliamentary setup like Azad Kashmir. In recent years there have been attempts by Azad Kashmir politicians to link the Northern Areas to their issue of pressing for a plebiscite to be held in all of Kashmir. Although this move seems to enhance their chances for a vote in favor of Pakistan—in case a referendum about the aspired affiliation to either side is ever held—the representatives of the Northern Areas refuse to cooperate. In their opinion the struggle for independence succeeded in casting off any relation to Kashmir. In recent times the federal government has moved to combine both regions. These plans have been rejected with the reasoning that there are no ethnic and regional similarities, no traffic links, and no economic exchanges. As the population of Azad Kashmir ranges well above two million the inhabitants of the Northern Areas (approx. 0.7 million) fear domination again by Kashmiri bureaucrats. Therefore they advocate an independent province.

Both India and Pakistan claim to be the rightful representatives of the people of Kashmir but in recent years Kashmiri nationalists have promoted the creation of an independent Kashmir composed of Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir and Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir Province. This is strongly rejected by both India and Pakistan who have strategic interests in the region and demand their share in the economic wealth of Kashmir.

The legal framework in the case of Kashmir applies to other high mountain regions of Pakistan as well (Figure 1). The Northern Areas are governed directly from Islamabad (Figure 2) under the auspices of the Federal Minister for Northern Areas who from October 1994 is supposed to be simultaneously the Chief Executive of the Northern Areas Council (*The News*, 5 May 1994; Siddiqui, 1994). The transfer of regional budgetary and legal procedures from Islamabad to Gilgit has been scheduled for the period commencing immediately after the first elections for a provincial assembly-type council. This outcome is the result of continuing efforts by popular movements from the Northern Areas whose inhabitants have been disenfranchised and have no representation in the National Assembly. Their continued efforts for achieving the "right of vote" (as graffiti and paint sprayings along the Karakoram Highway demand) epitomize regional disparities in the legal status of peripheral regions. The so-called *Tribal Areas* are distinguished in federally (FATA) and provincially (PATA) administered entities (Figures 1 and 2) in which no federal or provincial legislation is enacted unless the President of Pakistan or under him the Provincial Governor directs through the appointed Political Agent. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan devotes a special chapter to the *Tribal Areas* (Government of Pakistan, 1990: 175–178). At present the FATA is represented in the National Assembly by eight non-elected members although consecutive governments have announced the introduction of adult franchise. The representatives of a tribal areas' population, well above 5 million, are determined by the decision of 20,500 *malik* (tribal leaders) who possess and monopolize the right to vote (Siddiqui, 1994: 49).



1) Provincially Administered Tribal Areas in the North-West Frontier Province: Chitral, Dir, Swat, Kohistan, Malakand, Amb. Provincially Administered Tribal Areas in Baluchistan: Zhob, Loralai, Chagai (Dalbandin), Sibi (Marri & Bugti)
 2) Five Districts: Gilgit, Ghizer, Chilas, Skardu, Ghanche
 3) Federally Administered Tribal Areas: ten Tribal Areas & Agencies being represented by eight members in the National Assembly

FIGURE 2. Constitutional status of Pakistan-controlled territories.

Another colonial legacy stems from the continued application of the *Frontier Crimes Regulations Act* originally introduced in 1872. This statutory framework confirms a legal system executed by customary law in place of nationwide applicable civil codes. These few examples underline the fact that exclusive treatment is extended towards the mountainous border regions of Pakistan. These singular arrangements derive their origins from colonial roots and were meant for the relief of an external administration or for indirect rule. But at the same time they reflect the strategic accord of outside threat and regional conflicts as well as a heterogeneous approach to nation building. Besides these considerations the impact of confrontation

on national budgets is reflected in the share of defense expenditure versus allocations for the social sector. Pakistan is among the leading countries in the world that have spent three times as much for sustaining their army than for health and education during the 1980s (United Nations Development Program, 1990: 76). Although this ratio has been reduced in recent years the latest budget has allocated 35% of current expenditure to defense (Zahid Hussain, 1994: 60). Peoples' participation and the prospects for sustainable rural development in the Hindukush-Karakoram are hampered by artificial administrative constellations and lock-up of public resources.

IMPACT OF TRAFFIC INFRASTRUCTURE ON MOUNTAIN DEVELOPMENT

The strategic importance of the border regions in the mountain arc has to be judged as the driving force behind development of physical infrastructure. A secondary effect has been an increased integration of these regions into the concerned domestic economies. Independence in the subcontinent and the division of Kashmir has resulted in a re-orientation of exchange patterns (Kreutzmann, 1991) that initiated ambitious road projects. Up to

today this border region is experiencing major roadworks (Table 2) which allow motorized vehicles on asphalt roads to which the majority of villages are linked through networks of tracks for 4-wheel vehicles. This statement holds true for the Pamirs of Tajikistan, the Taghdumbash Pamir of Xinjiang, as well as for the Northern Areas and Kashmir on either side of the line of control.

TABLE 2
The trans-montane road systems in Pamir, Hindukush, Karakoram, and Himalaya

Mountain range	Destination	Name	Pass	Altitude (in m) ¹	Length (in km) ¹	Date ¹
Hindukush	Kabul-Qizil Qala	Salang Road	Salang	3,600	406	1965
Pamir	Osh-Khorog	Pamir Highway	Akbaytal	4,655	728	1932
	Dushanbe-Kala-i-Khum-Khorog		Chaburabat	3,252	536	1940
	Chargush-Khorog	Pamir-Ishkashim Road	Chargusch	4,344	280	
Tianshan	Kashgar-Naryn-Bishkek		Torugart	3,752	600	1983
Pamir/Kun Lun Shan	Kashgar-Taxkorgan		Subash	3,900	294	1958
Kun Lun Shan	Yarkand-Gartok		Khitai	5,341	1,200	1956-57
Pamir/Karakoram	Khunjerab-Taxkorgan	Friendship Highway	Khunjerab	4,550	120	1968-86
Karakoram/Himalaya	Karora-Chilas	Indus Valley Road	Shangla	2,150	248	1959-65
	Abbottabad-Gilgit	Kagan Route	Babusar	4,173	420	1948-49
Karakoram	Thakot-Kashgar	Karakoram Highway	Khunjerab	4,550	1,150	1964-78
	Gilgit-Skardu	Skardu Road	-	-	210	1950-68
Himalaya	Jammu-Srinagar	Kashmir Road	Banihal	2,196	330	1955-60
	Srinagar-Leh	Ladakh Road	Fatu La	4,100	435	1962-74
	Leh-Khardung La-Thoise	Nubra Road	Khardung La	5,636	80	1980
	Birgunj-Kathmandu	Tribhuvan Rajpath	Daman		221	1953-56
	Kathmandu-Xigazê	Arniko Rajmarg	Zanglu	5,481	500	1963-67
	Kalimpong-Xigazê		Natu La	4,310	370	

¹Altitude refers to highest point of road (pass); length indicates total destination between connected points; date describes the period of construction and/or the opening of road.

Source: extended table from Kreutzmann (1991: 712).

TABLE 3
Import of regular items from the lowlands to the Eastern Hindukush and Karakoram valleys of Northern Pakistan

Commodity	Import via Karakoram Highway (in million Rs)				Import via Lowari Top Road (in million Rs)	
	Gilgit District		Baltistan District		Chitral District	
	absolute	%	absolute	%	absolute	%
Wheat flour and grain	70.00	34.7	3.60	15.4	23.00	49.5
Rice					13.00	28.0
Pulses	7.00	3.5				
Cooking Oil	37.00	18.4				
Fresh Vegetables	9.30	4.6	2.74	11.7	1.61	3.5
Fresh Fruits	5.04	2.5	0.68	2.9	1.83	3.9
Beef and Mutton	29.95	14.9	10.01	42.8	1.21	2.6
Poultry Products	18.30	9.1	5.72	24.5	0.84	1.8
Milk Products	17.57	8.7	0.64	2.7	5.00	10.7
Fruit Juices	1.25	0.6				
Kerosene Oil	6.06	3.0				
Total	201.47	100.0	23.39	100.0	46.49	100.0
Total (Rs per capita)	738.6		83.2		172.2	

Source: data compilation and calculation according to Khan and Khan (1992: 15) and Kreutzmann (1994: Figure 7).



FIGURE 3. Public transport reaches remote villages of the Karakoram. Despite frequent natural hazard events such as snow avalanches, glacier advances, and mud flows that interrupt traffic between plains and mountains, the Government of Pakistan is committed to continuing efforts to keep this lifeline open (Photograph, Gulmit, Hunza, 21 April 1990).

Northern Pakistan was connected with down country Pakistan via the Kaghan Valley in 1949 when the first jeep reached Gilgit, and in 1957 the track was extended towards Hunza (*The Times*, 22 May 1949). A photograph of that event is on display in the Gilgit Municipal Library). The road across Babusar Pass (4,173 m) is open for three months in summer only and during the remaining nine months air links transport valuable supplies at high cost.

After the inception of Pakistan's first Village Aid Five-Year Plan in 1956 development efforts based on public funds were extended to the Gilgit Agency. A participatory approach facilitated the construction of suspension bridges to span the Hunza river near Danyor and the Gilgit river at Sher Qila. Villagers provided three-quarters of the cost, all the unskilled labor, and cut all the wood for bridge construction from communal forests (Clark, 1960: 22). At this early stage of development the Central Government covered "75 per cent of all non-recurring expenditure and 50 per cent of recurring expenditure"

(Clark, 1960: 21) trying a holistic approach by introducing new wheat varieties, new plows, different fruit varieties, improved livestock (pedigree bulls, merino rams, etc.), silkworm production, and new weaving looms for local tweeds. Out of the annual Village Aid Program's budget of Rs. 300,000 (approx. US \$65,000) two thirds were spent on transport alone. Not surprisingly the transport charges for one *maund* (1 *maund* equals 37.32 kg) of goods from Rawalpindi to Gilgit amounted to Rs 25–35 while the carriage cost on the return trip ranged between zero and eight Rupees (Staley, 1966: 102), highlighting the limited or negligible exports from the mountains. Air transport from down country to Gilgit increased the cost of a sack of chemical fertilizer from Rs. 5 by a factor of twelve to Rs. 60 (Clark, 1960: 21). In order to reduce transportation costs of basic goods an Indus Valley Road from Swat was proposed and in 1959 construction began (Table 2). As a result of the Pak-China Border Treaty of 1963 bilateral, cooperative efforts led to what has been termed the Pak-China Friendship or Karakoram Highway (KKH). By 1975 the KKH was accessible to trucks and since 1978 regular traffic plies between Rawalpindi and Gilgit (Figure 3).

In addition to trans-montane exchange of goods the KKH brings in subsidized food grains from down country Pakistan into the region. It is the life line for the ever-growing food deficit of Northern Pakistan (Table 3). Cereals, fresh meat (imported as live animals for slaughter in the bazaars), and cooking oil account for more than three quarters of all imports from the lowlands. The per capita dependence on supplies through this artery is highest for the Gilgit District and significantly lower in Chitral and Baltistan. Chitral is seasonally cut off from external supplies until the tunnel under the Lowari Pass might be completed. Baltistan has been linked to the Karakoram Highway through an asphalt road which now enables year-long traffic communication and a rapid change of market prices for basic commodities. Similarly, the Ladakh Road enhances dependency and connects the fertile valley of Kashmir with the high-altitude oases of Ladakh and Zaskar during summers; in addition to its ubiquitous military importance, huge quantities of food are brought into the region to supply army personnel, tourists, and growing numbers of local farming and trading households.

As early as 1972 the Government Report of Abdullah (1972) advocated the regular supply of basic food items to Northern Pakistan from the grain chambers of Punjab. The proposed concept favored an exchange of a different range of cash crops from the mountain valleys with surplus staple foods from the plains, with transport subsidized from public funds. In his opinion self-sufficiency in grain production cannot be achieved in the mountain valleys. For example, the highly subsidized and competitive price for wheat flour (*ata*) cannot be met by local producers. Consequently, the proportion of food produced locally is steadily decreasing (Figure 4). In some villages of the Hunza valley local production of *ata* is less than one third of the household consumption. The dependency on down-country supplies for other consumer goods is even higher. Consequently, for the first time in




FIGURE 4. Northern Pakistan: population growth and the development of food dependency.

history there are now no periods of starvation and famine for such disasters have been prevented by subsidies and crisis management from the Federal Government and the World Food Program. On the other hand, this dependency on external supplies does not enhance the prospects of sustainability (Figure 5).

The observation of Chambers (1983: 13) that research and development projects follow networks of roads has been supported by the extension of major development projects to this region in the aftermath of the KKH construction. The Government of Pakistan and non-governmental organizations with international funding have established a number of rural development and community services' projects with substantial impact on the physical infrastructure, local trading, and health services. Their efforts also focus on the extension and improvement of existing agricultural resources. By applying economies of different scales of production they aim to increase productivity through the cultivation of valuable niche products, like seed potatoes, vegetable seeds, and special varieties of fruit (Khan and Khan, 1992; Kreutzmann, 1993a, b). Exchange of goods between lowlands and highlands is the driving force behind this concept.

In periods of crises these development models based on long-distance trading relations for cereals and other staples are vulnerable, as for example in Gorno-Badakhshan. The dependency of the minority groups in the Pamirs on basic food and energy supplies caused a major regional crisis as an outcome of civil war in Tajikistan. Internationally organized emergency aid was called in to alleviate the famine in a region which regularly obtained about 80% of all edibles and the total supply of fuel from down-country Tajikistan (Aga Khan Founda-

tion, 1993). A potential scenario such as this must be kept in mind.

The recent blockages (May–June 1993) of the Karakoram Highway have been used by inhabitants of Kohistan as a political tool to convince the public administration that timber exports from the few remaining, and rather depleted, natural forests should no longer be prohibited. The royalties for wood-cutting concessions formed an important source of income in colonial times especially for the *jirgadar* (residents with entitlement to community resources) of Tangir and Darel. Local unrest and fluctuating timber prices in Punjab regulated the balance of supply and demand. Nevertheless, in 1925, six timber firms as well as the Northern Forest Company were involved in timber procurement from Tangir and Darel. These companies originated from as far as Abbottabad, Sialkot, Lahore, Hoti (near Mardan), and Peshawar (according to different records in the Gilgit Agency Diaries between 1921 and 1930 (IOL/PandS/10/973). Royalties paid by two timber firms in Darel alone accrued to more than Rs 1.2 million in the course of a few years. In comparison, all subsidies received by the hereditary rulers and governors from the Kashmir Durbar and the Government of India amounted to less than Rs 10,000 prior to 1927 and Rs 12,800 later (IOR/2/1083/284: 59). Timber has been the most valuable natural resource of the region and source of income for the *jirgadar*. In neighboring Gilgit marginal forest resources appear to have been depleted by 1929, as the administration remarked in their annual report: "Wood is every year becoming increasingly difficult to obtain. Practically all the wood on the nearest hills and in the nullahs [valleys] has now been cut, and it is necessary to go far afield for supplies." (IOL/PandS/



FIGURE 5. Regular supplies of wheat flour (*ata*) from the plains reach the mountain villages by truck along the Karakoram Highway while remote settlements are connected by jeep roads to the distribution centers (Photograph, near Ghulmet in Nager, 10 June 1991).




FIGURE 6. Wood cutters prepare timber trunks for downhill transport along wooden planks which form a chute of standard size logs. Timber contractors operate seasonal businesses in the Indus side valleys of Chilas and Kohistan Districts (Photograph, near Sazin, 2 August 1989).



FIGURE 7. Every spring, timber logs are gathered at the bank of the Indus for floating across the river and subsequent transport by truck to the commercial centers of the plains. Royalties paid to the local proprietors of forests are the contractors' compensation for the exploitation of natural wealth (Photograph, Chilas District, 27 March 1988).

12/3288: 6). Nevertheless timber harvesting with no appropriate replantation has continued in the Chilas District and Kohistan (Figures 6 and 7). In recent years royalties from this enterprise, the major source of income, have been at stake. While local residents annually negotiate bilateral contracts with timber dealers, the local foresters from the administration identify suitable stems for cutting. Despite only marginal incomes from toll taxes, the Forestry Department plays a crucial role as a regulative force. Efforts by the administration to restrict overexploitation and to stimulate replantation have been counterchecked by the residents with interference in traf-

fic flow and other measures. In this context the questions of ownership (Ali 1989, 1990) and control of natural resources such as forests, mineral wealth, and water (irrigation and hydro-energy potential) have become political issues relating to the unsolved constitutional status of the Northern Areas. Road blockages occur more frequently as the result of man-made hazards such as sectarian clashes. These have resulted in a tragic loss of life and have led to the closure of the KKH due to unpredictable dangers. Such unstable conditions affect other spheres of global and inter-regional exchange including tourism and trade.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND RECREATIONAL FACILITIES: THEIR RELEVANCE FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A new dimension of globalization has emerged from two phenomena that were previously of negligible importance: tourism as a service industry, and international concern about the conservation of nature.

International tourism and domestic recreational travel are recent service industries in Northern Pakistan and are directly related to the improvement of traffic infrastructure. The pace of development is illustrated by the fact that since 1980 the number of hotel beds in Hunza has increased by a factor of 100 (Figure 8). Tourism has become a significant field of employment for a growing number of people (Kreutzmann, 1994). So far the tourism enterprises in the region are controlled mainly by local people while the majority of tour operators originate from down country. The opening of the Khunjerab Pass for international travelers to and from China in 1986 boosted this seasonal industry and tourism became the major source of revenue in some villages in the Hunza valley. The expectations of foreign visitors are met by huge investments in infrastructure and services, financed by public and private loans. Tourist establishments occupy agricultural land that was formerly very valuable—irrigated terraces and orchards. In local decision making the risk of failure is overlooked because some entrepreneurs have derived high profits from their businesses over short time periods. Thus, tourism creates another form of dependency on external links and is also highly vulnerable to natural and man-made hazards. For local participants the income generated by tourism can alleviate the daily struggle for survival of the local inhabitants; however, the benefits of national park activities seem incomprehensible for concerned farmers. An example is the dispute about Khunjerab National Park.

Khunjerab National Park was inaugurated in 1975 and covers an area of more than 2,200 km² in the upper part of the Hunza watershed bordering with the extensive Taxkorgan Reserve of China (14,000 km²; established in 1984) which runs along the Pak-China border approximately between Wakhan and Taghdumbash Pamir in the northwest and K2 in the southeast (Schaller, 1980: 74–100; Schaller *et al.*, 1987: 54–55). A proposal drawn up by George Schaller promoted the protection of endangered species such as Marco Polo sheep (*Ovis ammon*), blue sheep (*Pseudois nayaur*), ibex (*Capra ibex*), snow leopard

(*Panthera unica*), and brown bear (*Ursus arctos*). The mountain farmers and shepherds who would have to give up their traditional pastures and fuel resources would be compensated by fees from trophy-hunters and by employment as guides and guards within the national park (Schaller 1980: 89, 99).

After the establishment of Khunjerab National Park local user communities who predominantly belong to the Abgerchi comprising about 180 households with more than 1,600 members in the upper Hunza valley—abided by the rules and regulations until 1990. For 15 years no compensation of any kind was given by the government institutions to the Abgerchi villages. Therefore, the peo-




FIGURE 8. The growth of the hotel industry in Hunza, 1979–1993.

TABLE 4
*Demands for compensation by the farmers of the Gojal Tahsil, Hunza Subdivision, Gilgit District,
 for governmental interference in Khunjerab National Park*

General demands

- ◊ Denationalization and privatization of Khunjerab National Park
 - ◊ Management responsibility must be given over to the hands of the local people
 - ◊ The previous loss made by the local people must be paid to them
-

In case of refusal the following conditions are demanded

- Free grazing must be allowed to the people without any disturbance from any government agency
 - 15 years of losses must be given to the affected people. The total loss [from deprived grazing grounds, from unjustified wood cutting by government institutions, like Forest Department etc., from expropriation of land for afforestation] is estimated at Rs 18,27 crore [Rs 182 million = US \$7.5 million]
 - If free grazing is not allowed, then a royalty of Rs 10,000 annually must be paid to each affected individual [178 households of Abgerchi = app. Rs 1.8 million per year]
 - 50 % of the National Park annual revenues must be paid to the local people
 - Business resources created in areas surrounding the National Park must be provided to the local people
 - Without the permission of the local people nobody must be allowed to do any sort of business or construction work within the National Park
 - From those institutions which have constructed buildings, payments must be made to the local people
 - Any institution who wants to perform construction will be liable to pay for the cost of land
-

Source: "Some of the facts and realities about the inherited pasture; Khunjerab Pass and how it was named as a national park" undated (1991).

ple formed a pressure group and presented their demands in court (Table 4). A stay order allowed them to reutilize their traditional pastures. Although the regional administration sought compromise and offered rightful compensation, no significant action followed. During the two years different agreements were negotiated, the KKH was temporarily blocked by Abgerchi families, military and police forces were called in, and various bureaucrats failed to solve the problem and were transferred elsewhere. The major argument has arisen about the amount of compensation which was calculated to a sum of Rs 182 million, equivalent to US \$7.5 million (Table 4).

The Abgerchi point out that while they used the Khunjerab pastures the ecological stability was maintained and the number of rifles and ammunition were limited. At the beginning of this century concern about wildlife along the Gilgit-Kashgar route was one of the factors for restricting the numbers of travelers through the Hunza valley to three per year. The colonial administration wanted "...to ensure that the people of Gilgit and Hunza are not unduly harassed by demands for supply and carriage, and to prevent the danger of the extermination of the *ovis poli* and other rare game on the Pamirs." (Letter to John Morley, Sec. of State for India, dated 27 September 1906 in IOL/PandS/10/279: 25). The numbers of Marco Polo sheep were quite high compared to those in 1986 when only 15–20 argali sheep were counted (Schaller *et al.*, 1987: 61). The major decrease of Marco Polo sheep populations occurred during the construction of KKH when poaching by army officers was common. The Khunjerab

Security Force was stationed within the National Park and this contributed to the depletion of forests and reduction of game. Many conservationists familiar with local conditions verify these factors; a major concern of the farmers is that the funds from international donors have not been delivered to the rightful beneficiaries.

No solution is in sight. Pakistani courts have received the petitions and documents. The plaintiffs question the Pakistan Government's position and the unconstitutional status of Northern Areas. How can a government with no legal authority to do so interfere in local affairs of mountain farmers, expropriate land and natural resources, and levy customs duties at Sost border post? This case exemplifies how lack of appropriate legal regulation can lead to conflict over what were initially minor problems. Until a holistic approach is adopted and the consent and cooperation of all social groups are secured, such projects cannot succeed. The IUCN has defined ten different categories of protected areas (Hamilton *et al.*, 1993: x–xi), and an appropriate classification must be determined for the Khunjerab National Park. The cooperation between villagers, administrative departments, development agencies, and international conservationists in the Chaprote forests (Ali 1989, 1990) might demonstrate how problems in another vulnerable sector can be approached. In this valley, tributary to the Hunza river, the regional power vacuum has permitted uncontrolled felling and exploitation of forests over quite some time which came to a standstill only through the combined efforts of all interested parties based on consensus.

CONCLUSION: SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND MINORITY RELATIONS

The concept of sustainability applied to the development problems of the study area should help to improve understanding of the traditional foundation, resource potential, and economic base of minority groups in high-altitude habitats in order to assess the future prospects. In Northern Pakistan minority peoples are predominantly subsistence farmers with limited integration in supra-regional exchange systems, and restricted participation in decision-making processes regarding their living space. Major interventions within the region have represented outsiders' interests and these underlie the transformation process. The cases presented here exemplify far-reaching interrelationships which brought about enduring effects on the daily life of the people. The legacy of colonial borders and their impact on international relations and regional conflicts should not be underestimated; even today they are a barrier to regional development. The exploitation of natural resources has been increased by improved communication structures; nevertheless, its origin goes back to colonial times. The legacy of indirect rule affects particular administrative configurations, and

the exclusion of affected groups from participation has to be regarded as counterproductive for sustainable development. International interests in tourism, development, and/or conservation have to be assessed in terms of their impact on local and regional societies, including a proper understanding of local conditions and needs. This knowledge forms a precondition for the preparation of development strategies.

Thus, sustainability should include measures for the civil rights of underprivileged peoples in evaluating strategies for rural development in high mountain habitats. Pearce (1988: 598) formulates that sustainable development implies "the whole process of economic progress in which economies contribute to improvements in human welfare." Thus it should safeguard the survival conditions for certain economic strategies, cultures, ethnic groups, and ecosystems. To achieve this goal requires more research from the perspective of affected people and the implementation of these results in development programs serving the medium-term needs on a consensual basis.

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